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1. Introduction
Until 1991, European rail policy accepted that rail trans-
port was a natural monopoly provided by a single vertical-
ly integrated government owned company providing in-
frastructure and train operations. Legislation required that 
the rail company be an autonomous unit responsible for 
its own decision taking and finances. Where the rail com-
pany had inherited costs, for instance for pensions that 
a commercial organisation would not incur, the govern-
ment should bear them. Where the government imposed 
public service obligations to provide unprofitable services 
or charge non commercial fares, the government should 
compensate the railway company. Otherwise, the railway 
should operate on a commercial basis.
Starting in 1991, policy shifted towards the introduction 
of competition within the rail sector. It was recognised 
that infrastructure was a natural monopoly, but argued 
that it was possible to have competition between alter-
native operators over the same infrastructure. EU legis-
lation now requires complete open access for freight and 
international passenger operators (although some restric-
tion is possible on the carriage of domestic passengers on 
these trains where this would damage services run under 
a public service contract). In order to reduce the risk of 
discrimination, it requires a degree of separation of infras-
tructure from operations, with separation of decisions on 
track access charges and capacity allocation from any train 
operating company and separate accounts. It requires an 
independent regulator to whom appeals can be made in 
the case of alleged discrimination. Only now is legislation 
underway which will require competitive tendering for 
public service contracts (but with provision for continued 
direct award of contracts where this process can be jus-
tified to an independent authority) and open access for 
commercial domestic passenger services (subject again to 
possible limitation where these would compete with ser-
vices operated under public service contracts).
Already in 1988 Sweden had completely separated rail in-
frastructure and operations into separate government ow-
ned companies and most of Europe has now followed. The 
alternative which is still permitted is for infrastructure and 
operations to be separate subsidiaries of the same holding 
company. This was the model adopted by Germany, Italy, 
Austria and now France. It is argued by these railways that 
this permits more efficient planning of investment and use 
of rail capacity, although this must be done in a way which 
does not discriminate against other train operators. 
Whilst on track competition between freight operators 
is now widespread in Europe, as noted above neither on 
track competition nor competition for public service 
contracts is currently required in the (domestic) passenger 
sector. However, competition for public service contracts 
is now the norm in Sweden and is rapidly spreading in 
Germany; in several other countries it is used for some 
noncore services. On track competition is also growing 
with two operators on key routes in Italy, Sweden and 
Austria and three operators on the most important route 
in the Czech Republic. 
But it is Britain which has taken rail passenger mar-
ket competition furthest. It no longer has a state owned 
passenger operator, with virtually all services operated by 
private companies under franchises awarded by means of 
competitive tenders. But it also has growing experience of 
on track competition as a result both of overlapping fran-
chises and of new open access competitors. This note will 
concentrate on the experience of Britain, whilst pointing 
out some key differences from other European experience. 
2. Rail reform in Britain
Rail reform in Britain essentially took place in the period 
1994-7, although there have been significant further deve-
lopments since. It has to comply with European Union 
legislation, although the recent decision by Britain to 
leave the EU means that, when that is implemented, this 
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constraint may no longer apply.
By 1997, infrastructure was separated from operations and 
placed in a new company, Railtrack, which was privatised 
by sale of shares. Freight operations were split into two 
companies and those companies were sold. Passenger ope-
rations were divided into 25 companies and these were 
privatised by competitive franchising. Passenger rolling 
stock was placed in three separate leasing companies and 
these were also sold off. Infrastructure maintenance and 
renewal was also placed in separate companies and sold. 
Thus Britain became the only country in Europe to have 
completely privatised its railway; elsewhere infrastructure 
and a large proportion of passenger services have always 
remained in the hands of publicly owned companies. The 
logic was that competition would be introduced wherever 
feasible in the structure, not just for all freight and (largely 
through competitive tendering) passenger operations but 
also for the leasing of rolling stock and the maintenance 
and renewal of infrastructure. The one element of the 
system that was deemed to be a natural monopoly – the 
planning and operation of the infrastructure – was to be 
regulated by a new independent regulatory body as now 
required by EU legislation.
Yet the success of the British approach cannot be described 
as other than mixed. Whilst the period since privatisation 
has seen rapid growth in both freight and passenger traf-
fic (not however mainly due to the reforms), there have 
been considerable problems relating particularly to the 
efficiency of the infrastructure manager and the successful 
working of the franchising system. In what follows we will 
review experience in each of these areas in turn, before see-
king to reach conclusions on the way forward.  
3. The Infrastructure Manager
At first, separation and privatisation of the infrastruc-
ture manager seemed to be achieving its objectives, with 
efficiency improving (Smith and Nash, 2014). However, 
there were other signs of problems ahead. Firstly, opera-
tors, particularly smaller ones, complained that they were 
totally dependent on a monopoly provider of infrastruc-
ture who was unresponsive to their needs. Secondly, and 
more seriously, there was evidence that the condition of 
the infrastructure was deteriorating, with an increased 
incidence of faults including in particular broken rails. 
Thirdly, the most important upgrading to which Railtrack 
was contractually committed – that of the West Coast 
Main Line – was running late and seriously over budget.
Matters came to a head in October 2000, when a broken 
rail caused a fatal accident on the East Coast Main Line at 
Hatfield, for which Railtrack and its maintenance contrac-
tors were subsequently found to share the blame. Because 
Railtrack had no adequate record of the state of its assets, 
the management panicked and imposed severe speed li-
mits until this could be checked and remedial action taken 
where necessary. The cost of this remedial action, the com-
pensation it had to pay to train operators and the cost of 
the overrun on the West Coast Main Line upgrade put 
Railtrack into financial crisis. It appealed to government 
for a bail-out, but instead the government chose to place it 
in administration until it could be taken over by a succes-
sor company, Network Rail.
From the first, Network Rail was a curious organisation. 
It took the legal form of a company limited by guarantee; 
that is, it was a private company but without shareholders. 
Instead it had members, selected from the industry and the 
general public. The government guaranteed all its debts 
and therefore had powers to intervene if it was in financial 
difficulties. But otherwise the task of ensuring it operated 
efficiently fell largely on the regulator. It was argued that 
this was better than an old style nationalised industry, as 
the regulator could provide an independent view of the 
extent to which Network Rail could improve its perfor-
mance in terms of costs and quality of service. But there is 
little doubt that the real reason for the choice of structure 
was that it enabled Network Rail’s debt to be regarded as 
outside the public sector. This was always a controversial 
issue, however, and in 2014 the British Office of National 
Statistics decided that in fact Network Rail’s debt should 
be treated as public sector debt. This led to an immediate 
change in the position of Network Rail, in that it was re-
quired to borrow from the government, its borrowing be-
came subject to limits imposed by the government and the 
government itself began to seek to influence Network Rail 
efficiency, raising issues of overlap with the rail regulator. 
Indeed the government consulted on significant changes 
to the powers of the regulator, but in the face of serious 
opposition did not pursue these changes.
As has already been noted, there was a substantial increase 
in Network Rail expenditure after Hatfield and this conti-
nued to grow for several years (Smith and Nash, 2014). 
This led to serious concern on the part of the regulator; 
benchmarking studies suggested that Network Rail fell a 
long way short of the efficiency of the most efficient in-
frastructure managers in Europe. The regulator set tough 
targets for cost reduction, and although costs were reduced 
these targets were not met. By 2009, concern about this 
and the simultaneous growth of costs of passenger train 
operators (despite the contracts being let by competitive 
tendering) led to the McNulty (2011) report into the effi-
ciency of the British rail network.   
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McNulty concluded that costs were at least 30% higher 
than they should have been, and that a major reason for 
this was a misalignment of incentives between the infras-
tructure manager and train operators. Now Britain had 
done more to try to overcome this misalignment than any 
other European country. It had a sophisticated system of 
track access charges which distinguished between literally 
hundreds of types of vehicle, designed to reflect the damage 
that vehicle did to the track given its weight, axleweight, 
unsprung mass, speed and bogie design (although despite 
this there had been a tendency to introduce more dama-
ging passenger rolling stock as fleet renewal took place, 
perhaps as a result of the short time horizons of passenger 
franchisees – Nash et al, 2014). Elsewhere in Europe, track 
access charges are much simpler, often depending only on 
train kilometres with little differentiation by type of train. 
It also had a performance regime whereby whichever part 
of the railway system – infrastructure or train operator – 
caused delays, it had to pay compensation for them. This 
included delays due to track maintenance and renewal 
work by Network Rail. Such a performance regime is also 
now a requirement of European policy but most countries 
were much slower to introduce one and again tended to 
make it much simpler.  
But McNulty saw other major areas in which the problem 
of misalignment of incentives had not been tackled. For 
instance, train operators generally only paid marginal cost 
for train operations (to the extent that there is a two part ta-
riff for passenger franchisees, there is simply a fixed charge 
that is passed back to government in terms of the bid level 
of subsidy or premium in the franchising competition). So 
train operators had no incentive to assist Network Rail in 
reducing the total cost of the system, for instance by redu-
cing capacity or quality requirements (for example by de-
ferring renewals) even where this was consistent with their 
needs. Similarly, they had no incentive to reduce the da-
mage done to services by track maintenance and renewals, 
for instance by investing in rolling stock and staff training 
which made diversion rather than bus replacement pos-
sible, since they would be fully compensated for increased 
costs and loss of revenue by Network Rail.
In the meantime, a further financial crisis has hit Network 
Rail. In the run-up to the 2015 general election, the go-
vernment announced a big increase in rail investment, in-
cluding electrification of several of the lines that remained 
in diesel operation. In practice, the costs and timescales for 
these investments also turned out to be much greater than 
the initial Network Rail estimates, leading to no fewer 
than three reviews of Network Rail being set up during 
2015, the most fundamental being the Shaw report (Shaw, 
2016). This reiterated the conclusion of McNulty that 
Network Rail should adopt a more regional structure, with 
only those activities which really needed to be undertaken 
nationally remaining at headquarters. The Network Rail 
regions or lines would have their own accounts facilitating 
benchmarking, and might even be concessioned to the pri-
vate sector. McNulty had also concluded that they would 
need to work more closely with franchisees, possibly even 
forming joint ventures. 
In practice the way forward has been the formation of 
alliances between the relevant regional management of 
Network Rail and the franchisee. Usually these have only 
covered specific activities, but in a couple of cases ‘deep’ 
alliances have been formed, with a joint management team 
and a sharing of costs and revenues
4. Franchising
Unlike other European countries, where franchising is 
only applied to subsidised services, in Britain virtually 
all passenger services are franchised, including commer-
cial ones. The main exceptions are Eurostar services to 
the continent via the Channel Tunnel and the Heathrow 
Express airport service, plus a small number of other open 
access services which will be discussed further in the next 
section.
When passenger services were first franchised, the passen-
ger services of the state owned operator, British Rail, were 
divided into 25 passenger companies following the inter-
nal structure of British Rail at the time. Each company 
served a specific geographical area and a specific type of 
service (inter city, London commuter or regional). The 
company winning the franchise took over this train opera-
ting company for the duration of the franchise. Franchises 
were let typically for 7-10 years, on the basis of the subsidy 
asked for or the premium offered for each year of the fran-
chise. Minimum levels of service were required and some 
fares (commuter fares and long distance off peak fares) 
were regulated. Franchisees were responsible for providing 
rolling stock, which they usually leased.
However, several of the first round of franchises failed 
because of the failure to reduce costs as forecast. 
Subsequently, two successive winners of the East Coast 
franchise, withdraw early in the franchise because of the 
failure to achieve the forecast revenue growth. As a result, 
disincentives for early withdrawal were tightened, with 
not just a performance bond, which would be surrende-
red but also more substantial requirements regarding the 
level of financial support that would be given to the train 
operating company by its parent company in the event of 
financial difficulties. 
The McNulty report favoured longer franchises, with 
contractualised commitments to reducing unit costs, 
as a way of strengthening incentives for cost reduction. 
However, before these changes could be implemented, the 
Department for Transport experienced major difficulties 
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with the letting of one of the most important franchises in 
the country – that for the West Coast Main Line. It was 
found to have failed to follow correctly its own procedures 
in awarding the franchise, and as a result the award was 
withdrawn and bidders compensated.
This led to two further reviews of franchising, one specifi-
cally on what changes were needed within the Department 
for Transport to avoid a repeat of these problems, and a 
wider review of franchising conducted by Richard Brown. 
In the meantime the letting of new franchises was halted, 
and existing franchises extended by direct negotiation.
The Brown report (2015) concluded that franchising 
should be resumed, but at a manageable pace in terms of 
the number let each year. Brown took a cautious approach 
to longer franchises, advocating a return to 7-10 year fran-
chises, with the possibility of extensions up to 15 years, 
but recognising that there might be a case for longer (or 
shorter) franchises in specific circumstances. He advoca-
ted the government bearing risks which the train operator 
could not influence, and in particular adjustments in pay-
ments if GDP growth did not meet expected levels. He 
also argued that the penalties for early withdrawal were 
now so large that they were severely constraining the num-
ber of companies who had the financial strength to bid for 
more than one franchise, or indeed to bid at all, and that 
they should be eased. He saw a good case for franchising 
of regional services to be undertaken by regional bodies 
rather than national government. 
This is essentially the approach now being taken to fran-
chising. There are now 11 companies involved in rail fran-
chising in Britain, of which four are government railways 
from other countries. Most of the rest are private bus 
companies.
As already noted, in those other countries which franchise 
rail services this has been confined to unprofitable services. 
Most franchises have been smaller and unlike in Britain 
there has been no obligation for the new operator to take 
over the staff of the former state-owned operator or to 
maintain its wages and conditions. As a result, it appears 
that franchising elsewhere has been much more successful 
in reducing costs. 
5. Open access
Given that even commercial services are franchised, the 
current approach in Britain to open access for passenger 
operators to run services without being awarded a fran-
chise is that these should be limited to cases where they 
are considered to be attracting significant new traffic to 
the railway rather than simply taking traffic from the fran-
chisee. The regulator is the judge of this. There are current-
ly two open access operators on the East Coast Main Line, 
both running from London to destinations not served by 
regular through services by the franchisee. The regulator 
has approved application for two further open access ser-
vices, one on the East Coast main line and one on the 
West. In all cases, the parent of the open access operator 
is a major operator of franchised services (either Germany 
Railways or Firstgroup). 
Again, this is totally unlike the situation in the other 
countries allowing open access competition, where com-
mercial operations are still largely handled by the state 
owned company without competition for a franchise to do 
so. In those countries there is no explicit protection for the 
existing operator, although there may be many barriers to 
entry, such as difficulties in getting access to infrastructure, 
stations, depots and suitable rolling stock.
In 2016, the British Competition and Markets Authority 
issued a report advocating a major extension of on track 
competition either by easing the rules for new commercial 
operations to enter the market or by revising the franchi-
sing process to create more overlapping franchises (there 
is already some competition between adjacent franchisees 
who serve the same cities either by different routes or types 
of service). Ultimately it might be the case that commer-
cial services would be left entirely to open access operators 
rather than franchised out. It considered that this would 
improve cost control, service quality and fares.   
6. Conclusions
It will be seen that British experience of rail reform has 
been far from straightforward; indeed a number of serious 
problems have emerged. Of these, the most important is 
the serious cost increases that have occurred. These appear 
to have a number of causes, including the misalignment 
of incentives between train operators and infrastructure 
managers, and the short time horizons of train operators. 
Possible solutions appear to be the use of longer franchises, 
deep alliances including revenue and cost sharing between 
franchisees and Network Rail and the spread of purely 
commercial open access operations.
In each case, the policy is not without drawbacks. Longer 
franchises mean longer periods without competition. 
Deep alliances with the main franchisee may disadvantage 
freight and other passenger operators over the same tracks. 
More open access is difficult to accommodate in a railway 
short of capacity and may lead to a reduction in the quality 
of integration between different services running over the 
same tracks. 
There is some evidence that the introduction of compe-
tition into the passenger sector has been more successful 
in the other countries that have introduced it, in particu-
lar Sweden and Germany in the case of competition for 
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franchises (Nash, C. A., Nilsson J. E. and Link H., 2013) 
and Italy in the case of on track competition (Croccolo, F., 
Violi, A., 2013). However, there are significant differences. 
As noted above, in Sweden and Germany franchises are 
usually shorter and have more freedom to revise wages and 
conditions. On track competition in Italy takes place on 
the new high speed network, which has plenty of spare 
capacity (except for some problems at terminals), and is 
competing against a state owned operator that has not had 
to compete for the right to operate on those routes. With 
the implementation of the Fourth Railway Package it is 
likely that there will be a considerable increase in com-
petition both for and in the rail passenger market in the 
coming years, and more evidence will emerge on what 
approach works best in different circumstances.
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1. Introduction
In April 1987, the Japanese National Railways (JNR) un-
derwent reform. It was divided into a single freight railway 
and six passenger railways (JRs). This is recognized as the 
first case of railway reform of a nationwide state-owned 
railway in modern history, implemented prior to similar 
reforms in other countries. Mainly because of increasing 
transport volume, productivity, and sustainable manage-
ment of the JRs, this is considered as a successful reform of 
a public enterprise in the country. 
2. Background of the Reform 
Since the establishment of the JNR as a public enterprise 
in 1949, it was profitable and enjoyed a dominant status 
in the transport sector until the 1950s. However, compe-
tition from other modes of transport became severe, and 
the JNR lost its competitive edge. It also shouldered the 
burden of construction costs of new lines. The JNR ran 
a deficit in 1964, and the annual deficit continued for 
many subsequent years. It accumulated long-term debt 
each year, and at the time of reform in 1987, this debt 
amounted to 37.1 trillion yen, which was roughly equiva-
lent to the combined national debts of several developing 
countries. Besides a substantial fall in rail use caused by 
rapid motorisation and the development of air transport, 
the JNR Reconstruction Supervision Committee posited 
two main reasons for the JNR’s failure.
First, the JNR was a public corporation which resulted in 
the following problems:
a) Politicians and the government interfered in the 
JNR’s management. For example, politicians exerted 
pressure to construct unprofitable new lines. 
b) The JNR’s administration was not autonomous. For 
example, the budget, personnel, and wages were stipu-
lated by the Diet or the cabinet.
c) The relationship between managers and the workers’ 
unions was fraught with problems. Labour unions in 
the JNR were unaware of costs and demanded benefits 
without considering wider implications.
d) Business scope was strictly limited. Rigid regula-
tions prevented the JNR from expanding its business 
scope to non-railway activities.
Second, the JNR was a nationwide organisation, and the 
unified organisational structure throughout the country 
caused the following issues:
a) The size of the organisation was beyond effective 
management control; it was difficult for managers to 
effectively control the monolithic organisation. Then, 
employees became increasingly disloyal to the JNR, 
and this further hindered effective management.
b) Management was standardised. Essential issues such 
as fare levels, timetables and station locations were cen-
trally planned and local conditions and requirements 
were not reflected in those plans. 
c) Since management of the JNR was implemented 
on a nationwide basis, several divisions were sustained 
based on irrational reliance. When the reliance had 
become excess, ineffective divisions could be sustained. 
This hindered effective management and revitalisation 
of railway operations.
d) Managers and employees lacked the conscious of 
competition because no similar system existed in Japan. 
Although competition with other transport modes had 
become intense, the administration was not oriented 
to compete with them through flexible management.    
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In addition to financial difficulties, the JNR also faced 
severe public criticism because of ineffective management. 
As a result, JNR reform had to be undertaken. The objec-
tive of the JNR reform was to solve the abovementioned 
issues. Accordingly, privatisation of the organisation was 
planned as a way to solve issues perceived to be attribu-
table to its public enterprise status, and it was planned to 
divide the JNR into several companies to address issues 
attributable to the nationwide, monolithic nature of the 
organisation. 
3. Outline of the JNR Reform Process 
1) Establishment of JRs
The JNR was reformed in April 1987. Through this pro-
cess, the railway network was divided according to regions, 
and six independent passenger companies were established. 
Although the Shinkansen Holding Corporation (SHC) 
(a government agency) owned the infrastructure of the 
Shinkansen lines at the time of reform, the passenger com-
panies owned the assets of conventional lines. In 1991, the 
three passenger companies bought the Shinkansen lines 
infrastructure from the SHC. Thus, regarding the assets 
built during the JNR era, each passenger company sub-
sequently owned the infrastructure of both the Shinkansen 
and conventional lines. 
The JNR reform predicted that the railway operation of 
the three passenger companies on Japan’s main island 
(Honshu) would be profitable. Thus, JR East, JR Central, 
JR West along with JR Freight started their management 
succeeding the JNR’s liabilities. Then, as mentioned above, 
the three companies in Honshu purchased the infrastruc-
ture of the Shinkansen lines. As a result, these four com-
panies held 14.5 trillion yen in total liabilities and have 
been, since then, carrying out their management repaying 
the allocated liabilities.
In contrast, it was predicted that the operation of the other 
three passenger railway companies on Japan’s smaller is-
land would become unprofitable. Thus, to incentivise ma-
nagement and avoid paying anuual subsidies, the govern-
ment allocated Management Stabilization Funds to these 
companies. At the time of the JNR reform, JR Hokkaido, 
JR Shikoku and JR Kyushu received 682.2, 208.2, 387.7 
billion yen respectively.  
In the freight sector, a single nationwide company (JR 
Freight) was established since, different from the passenger 
sector, the general distance travelled by freight transport is 
much greater and freight trains usually cross the borders 
which demarcate the networks of divided passenger com-
panies. Another distinct characteristic of the JNR reform 
was that it was designed so that JR Freight could access the 
trunk lines owned by the passenger companies. The back-
ground to this design of the railway reform was that freight 
rail transport had been unprofitable during the JNR’s his-
tory. Although it was essential to cut excess cross-subsidies 
between the passenger and freight sectors and terminate 
irrational reliance between the two, it was also important 
to achieve sustainable management of JR Freight. Thus, 
JR Freight was released from infrastructure maintenance 
responsibilities for the purpose of reducing its operational 
costs. Also, track access charges were set at relatively low 
levels, namely ‘avoidable costs,’ aiming to shoulder only 
those inherent to freight rail transport. 
2) Issues behind the JNR Reform
The JNR reform was one of the most serious items on the 
political agenda in Japan in the 1980s. To implement the 
reform, several issues needed to be solved. For example, by 
the 1990s, 83 unprofitable local lines had been separated 
from the JNR/JRs’ network to make the management of 
JRs sustainable. However, the most serious issue had to do 
with long-term liabilities and surplus personnel.  
As noted above, the JNR’s long-term liabilities had accu-
mulated to 37.1 trillion yen. To settle these liabilities, the 
government agency called the JNR Settlement Corporation 
(JNRSC) was established and succeeded 25.5 trillion yen. 
JNRSC made efforts to refund the succeeded liabilities by 
means such as selling shares of JRs and selling surplus land 
not required for railway operation. Despite its efforts, the 
JNRSC could not refund all the liabilities, and it dissolved 
in 1998. As a result, 13.8 trillion yen was transferred from 
JNR’s long-term liability to a national debt. 
Regarding the issue of surplus personnel, the JNR em-
ployed 277,020 workers as of April 1986. It was estimated 
that there would be approximately 93,000 excess person-
nel after the JNR reform. The government approached this 
issue by establishing a Surplus Personnel Reemployment 
Measures Headquarters and enacting a special law which 
requested active cooperation from various national sectors 
to employ them. As a result, the new railway companies 
reemployed 203,000 workers while the others changed 
jobs or retired. 
4. Results of the JNR Reform 
1) Management of JRs
The results of the JNR reform have been outstanding. The 
newly established JRs could focus their market and started 
to provide transport services appropriate for each region. 
Even in the freight sector, which had been loss-making in 
the JNR era, the serious downturn trend since the 1970s 
has been reversed and the traffic volume (tonne-km) has 
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become stable since the reform. As for the passenger 
sector, since the termination of the cross-subsidy to the 
freight sector, it has become possible to re-invest the pro-
fit to improve passenger services. Although the transport 
volume (passenger-km) decreased 6% in the decade prior 
to JNR reform, the trend changed significantly, increa-
sing to 27%, in the decade after the reform. Furthermore, 
following the business model of other Japanese private 
railways, JR passenger companies also commenced affilia-
ted business, actively utilising and developing the space 
in and around the stations. Nowadays, especially around 
large stations, it has become common for group firms of 
JR passenger companies to promote various kinds of affi-
liated businesses utilising the external economy associated 
with railway operations, and the revenue of these business 
activities has been increasing. 
2) Privatisation of the 4 JRs 
As for the three JR companies in Honshu, they have 
been in the black even they bear the cost of infrastructure 
and the burden of the allocated JNR liabilities. As plan-
ned, all shares of JR East, JR West, and JR Central were 
listed in 2002, 2004 and 2006 respectively. By contrast, 
JR Kyushu’s railway operation segment has been making 
losses. However, the company increased their revenue 
through affiliated businesses and, as a whole, has been in 
the black. In October 2016, all shares of JR Kyushu were 
also listed, and its Management Stabilization Funds were 
liquidated by paying railway-related expenses such as the 
advance payment of lease fee for the Shinkansen infras-
tructure, which was constructed after the JNR reform. 
As shown by these cases, the JR companies improved 
rail services and developed affiliated businesses as well. 
Additionally, they have promoted their businesses based 
on the schemes planned in the JNR reform without recei-
ving annual subsidies from the government. 
5. Lessons and Future Challenges
1) Lessons: Post-Reform Improvement Factors
When we consider the positive performance of JRs, we 
can conclude that the JNR reform has been successful thus 
far. This success can mainly be attributed to privatisation 
and regional division, both of which solved the problems 
underlying JNR’s failure, as noted above. This section dis-
cusses other essential issues which are distinct from typical 
EU railway systems.
First, the passenger railway company operates and manages 
both infrastructure and operation in Japan. Although 
there are some lines where the owner of the infrastruc-
ture is different from the railway company, the railway 
company maintains integrated operation even on these 
lines. Thus, besides a few exceptional cases, we note that 
passenger railway operation is integrated in Japan. This has 
been advantageous not only for smooth railway operations 
but also for coordinated investment into railway systems 
and promoting affiliated businesses. In Japan, on-track 
competition has not been introduced at all and compe-
titive bidding has been utilised only in limited cases in 
recent years. Instead, the JNR reform also played a role 
in improving yardstick competition between the railway 
companies. Thus, managers and employees in the Japanese 
railways have sufficient motivation to increase profits as an 
independent (private) company with three types of com-
petition: 1) competition with other modes of transport, 
2) competition between tracks (in some sections) and 3) 
yardstick competition.
Second, passenger through-trains are operated with a clear 
separation of operational responsibilities at the border 
station between the companies. Through-train passenger 
services were common among Japanese railways and were 
also introduced among JRs. However, different from open 
access in EU countries, each company takes responsibility 
for both train operation and infrastructure management, 
as noted above. In general, drivers change at the border 
station and drive trains on their company’s track only. 
As this example shows, a fundamental policy in Japanese 
passenger railway operation is the clear separation of ope-
rational responsibilities at the border station. This has 
contributed to smooth, efficient and safe passenger train 
operation in Japan. 
 2) Future Challenges
The 30th anniversary of the JNR reform is on April 2017. 
We can say that the management of JR companies has 
been sustainable so far based on the original scheme plan-
ned at the time of reform. Nevertheless, when we consider 
the recent changes in the transport market and the changes 
that are likely to occur in future, there are some challenges 
which the railway sector in Japan has to deal with.
Despite the positive performance of rail transport in urban 
areas and some inter-city lines, many local lines face severe 
declines in passenger numbers. Since the population in 
Japan will decrease in the future, local lines will become 
more unprofitable. Certainly, division through the JNR 
reform eliminated excess cross-subsidies between the divi-
ded networks. But some JRs still have a large rail network. 
Thus, if cross-subsidization continues within the com-
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pany, even the transport services on the profitable lines 
would lose competitiveness because of the lack of invest-
ment funds. 
As for JR Hokkaido and JR Shikoku where the average 
passenger transport density is lower than other JRs, they 
still possess Management Stabilization Funds and uti-
lise the Fund’s interest to cover railway operation losses. 
However, because of the low-interest rates in the Japanese 
financial market, the Fund’s interest has not accrued 
the amount expected at the time of the JNR reform. 
Thus, management has been stringent particularly in JR 
Hokkaido in the last few years. If it is decided to sustain 
the local lines with a limited number of passengers, certain 
measures such as vertical separation and PSO contracts 
should be introduced to gain financial support from the 
local governments.
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Railways employ distinct technologies: steel wheels on 
steel rails furnishing low rolling resistance; long, thin 
shape yielding low wind resistance; and, potential for 
electric traction with higher energy efficiency and lower 
carbon emissions. Railways can move high volumes wi-
thin a restricted space and are extremely safe. But, rail 
has limited flexibility to serve areas outside its immediate 
reach and is less competitive at shorter distances.
The role of the railway is driven by the railway’s capabi-
lities, but also by its competitors and by the geographic, 
demographic and institutional framework within which 
the transport system functions. Autos are more flexible, 
but use more energy and land space. Trucks are flexible, 
do not require high volumes and move at higher speeds, 
but also have higher costs and impact on the environ-
ment. Airlines are fastest over long distances, but use 
much more energy. Above the network is the country’s 
institutional framework, including policies toward public 
funding and the mix of public/private roles and the role 
of regulation.
The outcome is a complex pattern of technologies and ser-
vices. The pattern is never fixed: technologies evolve, go-
vernments shift with political currents and the structure of 
the economy develops. This is especially true of the U.S., 
partly because of its leading role in development of trans-
port technologies, but also because reliance on competi-
tion and private ownership fosters an unusual flexibility to 
change both in the transport sector and in the economy at 
large. Table 1 gives an overall picture of the intercity rail 
system in the U.S.
Railways in the U.S. carry short-haul intercity passengers 
Institutional Reform of Intercity Railways in the U.S.
Louis S. Thompson* 
* Principal at “Thompson, Galenson and Associates”, lou.thompson@gmail.com 
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between closely spaced cities, typically within one state, 
as well as long-haul intercity passenger services that often 
operate interstate with sleeper and diner services. At the 
same time, and often over the same tracks, U.S. railroads 
haul enormous quantities of freight. Table 2 gives an ove-
rall picture of the scale and trends of rail operations of the 
U.S. rail system.
Intercity passenger services in the U.S. were originally 
provided by private railroads. Although these services 
could be sustained before the advent of the automobile, 
this became more difficult after World War II. The abi-
lity of most families to have a car, the construction of the 
Interstate Highway System and the emergence of the jet 
airplane destroyed the intercity rail passenger market and, 
by 1970, passenger losses were seriously weighing on the 
private freight railroads.
The government’s response was to create Amtrak, a fede-
rally owned corporation intended to relieve the freight 
railroads of all intercity rail passenger service beginning in 
1971 and to revitalize passenger service under new mana-
gement. Over its lifetime Amtrak has undergone conti-
nual restructuring and reorganization as Congress and 
the President have struggled to reach a stable definition of 
Amtrak’s role and amounts and sources of funding.
Amtrak reports its operations in three lines of business: 
25 short-haul “day” services that operate over the tracks 
of freight railroads (paying access fees), mostly within a 
single state and mostly with one train/day in each direc-
dossier
tion though some routes have multiple daily frequencies; 
15 long-haul trains, mostly with diners and sleepers and 
mostly once-daily frequency, all of which operate over 
the lines of freight railroads and pay access fees; and, 
the Northeast Corridor between Washington, DC and 
Boston, MA through New York City where there are 38 
higher-speed services and 48 medium speed services daily 
together carrying about 38% of Amtrak’s passengers and 
generating 54% of its revenues.
By Amtrak’s accounting, the long haul trains are money 
losers ($530 million in 2015). The short haul trains ap-
pear to be less unprofitable ($86 million in 2015) and 
the Northeast Corridor trains have an operating profit of 
about $482 million, though it is not clear what share of 
the cost of the infrastructure they are carrying (Amtrak, 
MPS). Amtrak owns and maintains most of the Northeast 
Corridor infrastructure and charges commuter and freight 
operators for access. The relative performance of the lines 
of business is clouded by the fact that many of the short 
haul trains receive state support (which Amtrak counts as 
revenue) and Northeast Corridor results are impacted by 
unclear sharing agreements with local commuter authori-
ties and freight operators.
Whether Amtrak has been a success depends on the point 
of view. One objective, separating passenger losses from 
freight finances, was clearly achieved and, in conjunction 
with freight deregulation, permitted the freight railroads 
to remain in private hands. The success of revitalizing 
passenger service was not met as well: Amtrak’s traffic has 
Network Industries Quar erly | l. 8 o 4 | 2016 1
 
Network Industries newsletter  | vol. 13 | n°3 | 2014        14 
not grown rapidly and its cost, at $70 billion ($2015), has 
been high. 
The U.S. railroad freight system consists of 7 large (“Class 
I”) freight railroads, all of which are privately owned, along 
with 21 smaller “regional” railroads (again all private) and 
some 546 small “short lines” that are mostly privately ow-
ned and operated, though some are owned by state or local 
authorities. The Class I railroads account for about 70% 
of the track-miles and 95% of the revenues of the overall 
U.S. rail system (AAR, 2015).
The U.S. rail freight system is an example of one of the 
most successful cases of institutional reform in the last four 
decades. In the early to mid-19th century, the railroads 
occupied a near-monopoly position in most markets and 
they were not particularly shy about exploiting their po-
sition. This, along with the flamboyant excesses of early 
rail investors (“Robber Barons”) generated great political 
opposition. In 1876, the Congress created a regulator (the 
Interstate Commerce Commission) aimed at reining in 
the railroads’ economic and political power.
Unfortunately, as often happens with public regulators in 
the political arena, the objectives were not well defined and 
were actually perverse in their economic impacts. Over 
time, the system morphed from limiting monopoly power 
into limiting railroads’ ability to compete with highways 
and barges. At the same time, federal and state programs 
that built highways and waterways without making trucks 
and barges pay an appropriate share for their use began 
to weigh heavily on the financial performance of the pri-
vate rail system. Regulatory policies to force the private 
railroads to cross-subsidize passenger service out of freight 
“profits” added insult to injury and, by 1970, much of the 
system was badly weakened financially.
Congress acted first to create Amtrak in order to remove 
the passenger support burden from the railways and put it 
on the federal and state governments where it belonged. 
Though helpful, this was not enough and by the mid-
1970s, most freight railroads in the Northeast were ban-
krupt. In response, the Congress first nationalized the 
Northeast rail system and reorganized, rehabilitated and 
refinanced the system with public money. Then it re-priva-
tized the system (creating Conrail). When it became clear 
that even this was not enough, the Congress took the final 
step and deregulated the railroads in 1981 (along with air-
lines in 1979 and trucking in 1981).
For the freight railroads, deregulation meant that, within 
very wide limits to control excess earnings and abuse of 
monopoly power over a single shipper, they could comple-
tely control the tariffs and services offered. In particular, 
railroads could offer contract rates to shippers in which 
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guaranteed tariffs were offered in return for volume com-
mitments, shipper ownership of wagons, railway or ship-
per investment in specialized facilities and many other 
terms reflecting a market-driven balance between the 
benefits and costs available to railway and shipper.
The results of the deregulation of rail freight were remar-
kable. From inception to about 2004, while traffic (ton-
km) grew by 83% and the regulator’s measure of return 
on investment grew from 3.09% to 8.46%, the average 
freight tariff in real terms fell by 58%. Although there 
were complaints from individual shippers (as there always 
are), there is little doubt that deregulation far exceeded 
even the most optimistic of expectations.
How did this happen? Deregulation enabled a rapid 
increase in productivity, mostly because contract rate-
making permitted railroads to work much more closely 
with shippers to offer more flexible and efficient services. 
Output per employee grew by 434%; output per locomo-
tive (horsepower adjusted) grew by 34%; and, traffic den-
sity (ton-miles/mile of line operated) more than tripled: 
the increase was driven partly by traffic growth, partly by 
a reduction in the miles of line operated (abandonments 
were made easier by deregulation), and partly because 
of voluntarily negotiated multiple use of lines (“trackage 
rights”) wherein the percentage of tracks with more than 
one operator grew from 9% in 1981 to 28% in 2015. 
Over the same period, Class I railroad ownership of freight 
wagons fell from 66% in 1981 to less than 28% by 2015: 
this meant that shipper-owned equipment could be more 
specialized and productive while at the same time relieving 
railroads of the investment burden.
There were also qualitative changes in the freight system 
brought about by the freedom that deregulation permitted. 
For example, container traffic grew from about 2.7 million 
units in 1990 to nearly 12 million in 2014. Included in 
this total is traffic for J.B. Hunt, a major trucking com-
pany that purchases wholesale capacity from railroads and 
then markets retail container loads to its customers, many 
of which do not know (or care) that railroads are involved 
in the long-haul part of the shipment.
The tariff picture after 2004 has been more mixed because 
the combination of growth in rail traffic with growing 
congestion on the U.S. highways (partly caused by ina-
dequate public funding of highway maintenance and 
construction) meant that the railroads could raise tariffs 
and they did so, by about 34% through 2014: this was 
at least partly justified by the need to finance the capacity 
needed to handle the traffic shifting from roads and the 
tariffs are still 43% below 1981 levels in real terms. Then, 
the financial crisis of 2008 caused a drop in traffic from 
which the rail system has only now fully recovered. With 
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this said, the current picture of the U.S. freight railroads 
is one of independence, adequate earnings and reasonable 
future prospects, subject to qualifications discussed below.
The future of passenger services is largely driven by public 
funding at local, state and federal levels. Unfortunately, 
the U.S. political system has been increasingly divided 
over the issue of taxes and effectiveness of governments at 
all levels. There are no clear prospects for political consen-
sus on the need for passenger service in the near future (if 
ever). For rail freight, the chief political danger is re-regu-
lation as demanded by various powerful shipper groups 
or relaxation on truck sizes and weights as demanded by 
truck lobbyists. Paradoxically, since the freight railroads 
benefit from the regulatory status quo, political inaction 
is their friend.
Beyond politics, there are other portents. The need to re-
duce carbon emissions could be critical. Although power-
ful political forces continue to deny the fact of climate 
change for ideological or self-interest reasons, there is a 
growing consensus that the U.S. must participate in glo-
bal programs to reduce carbon emissions and the U.S. is 
increasingly committed by treaty to do so.
The energy efficiency of rail and the ability to use electric 
traction generated from low carbon sources gives rail an 
advantage if carbon emissions are traded or taxed. This is 
not an overwhelming advantage, however, as the economic 
cost of reducing carbon emissions by investment in rail 
can often be much higher than alternative programs such 
as LED lighting or home insulation. Carbon emission 
reduction is a positive result, but must be combined with 
other benefits such as time savings, lower tariffs, safety or 
noise reduction if increased spending on rail passenger ser-
vice is to be justified. 
Carbon reduction cuts both ways for freight. On the one 
hand, railways are energy efficient and thus would bene-
fit from traffic shifted from less efficient trucks, assuming 
that carbon is efficiently priced. On the other hand, a large 
percentage of the world’s carbon-based fuels are transpor-
ted by rail and any carbon emission reduction program 
will reduce rail traffic, especially coal. Since coal makes up 
about 39% of U.S. rail freight traffic, and is one of the 
most profitable commodities, carbon reduction programs 
are a threat to U.S. railways unless other technologies, such 
as carbon capture and sequestration, are implemented.
There are good reasons to expect continued evolution of 
rail passenger organization in the same direction as in the 
past few decades. Amtrak short haul lines will increasin-
gly be shifted to a higher share of state financing, which 
will ultimately cause the states to ask for a greater role in 
planning and operating the systems. Amtrak has tended to 
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lose competitions for operation or maintenance contracts 
because of its high costs and rigid work conditions, so 
Amtrak’s role in short haul services may well shrink. The 
existing Amtrak long haul lines appear to be in rough 
equipoise between the Congressional forces wanting ser-
vice to their state or district and the budgetary forces that 
are reluctant to pay: except at the margin, little change is 
likely.
The Northeast Corridor represents about 30% of the U.S. 
population on 9% of its land area and most resembles 
areas in Europe and Asia where longer haul, higher speed 
rail passenger service makes economic sense. Given ade-
quate funding (always difficult), continued upgrading 
and rehabilitation of the Northeast Corridor would be a 
good investment. The challenge will be to create a new 
institutional framework, possibly based on a form of in-
frastructure separation that would more clearly assign res-
ponsibilities for investment and operation among all the 
commuter, intercity passenger and freight operators that 
the NEC serves. It seems unlikely that a visionary new 
Northeast Corridor line serving exclusively high-speed 
trains can ever be built because of the enormous cost.
Two entirely new intercity passenger services are in pros-
pect. All Aboard Florida is a wholly privately financed, 
medium-speed service that expects to start service on a 
three hour schedule on the 235 mile route from Miami to 
Orlando in 2017. About 50 miles of line between Cocoa, 
FL, and Orlando International Airport will be on newly 
constructed tracks: the remainder will be conducted on 
tracks of the Florida East Coast Railroad, whose parent 
company is the sponsor of the project. The outcome of 
the project, especially the ridership actually achieved, will 
be a significant harbinger for the potential for new private 
sector rail passenger projects.
The California High-Speed Rail project is the only high-
speed rail project under construction in the U.S. The 220 
mile/hour system will be built in stages, initially connec-
ting San Francisco with Los Angeles and Anaheim, with 
connections to Sacramento and San Diego added later. 
The system is designed to deliver 2 hour 40 minute service 
between San Francisco and Los Angeles. The cost of the 
project has been estimated at $64 billion for San Francisco 
to Los Angeles/Anaheim with service to be initiated in 
2028. The California High-Speed Rail Authority intends 
to manage the planning and construction of the system 
and then to contract or concession operations to a private 
operator.
The project has been controversial, partly because construc-
tion of a major transportation project in an inhabited (and 
litigious) environment always engenders opposition. More 
important, though, is finance. California voters approved 
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a bond issue in 2008 that provided about $9 billion for 
the system. Federal funds added another $2.9 billion. In 
addition, 25% of the state’s receipts from its carbon tra-
ding program have been dedicated to the project. This 
is projected to yield around $500 million annually until 
2025 when the remainder of the funding through 2050 
will be monetized to yield another $5.2 billion. Finally, 
the Authority projects that the system will be profitable 
and the expected net revenue stream can be monetized 
in 2028 and 2029. Even so, accepting the Authority’s 
medium demand projection leaves an uncovered gap of 
at least $15 billion possibly covered through new federal 
grant programs.
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Reform background and preconditions
The Russian railway system is one of the world’s largest. 
Russell Pittman (2013) calls it “…one of the economic 
wonders of the 19th, 20th, and 21st century world”. 
Railways account for more than 85% of freight tonne-
kilometers (excluding pipelines) and 27% of passenger-
kilometers (Rosstat 2016). Railway transport is the back-
bone of the entire Russian economy. Many basic national 
industries (mining, metallurgy, etc.) have no alternative 
transport mode. It is not a surprise that for decades “rai-
lways” and “transport” were actually synonyms in eve-
ryday Russian language. 
For nearly a decade the industry was not affected by the 
dramatic socio-economic reforms that started in Russia in 
1992. The Railway Ministry (MPS – Ministerstvo Putei 
Soobschenija) combined the roles of service provider, 
policy maker, and regulator. It remained a monolithic 
non-transparent state monopolist amidst the developing 
market economy. 
The declared reason was that the risk of damaging the 
highly integrated railway system could, in turn, harm not 
only Russia, but other post-soviet states for which rai-
lways had been the essential connecting link.
But in the beginning of the 2000s the enormous invest-
ment needs of the industry could not be funded at the 
expense of operations any more. Loss-making passenger 
services needed growing internal cross-subsidies. The si-
tuation demanded changes. The government recognized 
that competition, if introduced, could attract private ca-
pital, drive cost reduction and improve service level. 
Railway reform program and initial steps
The railway reform in Russia started in 2001 after adop-
ting the “Program for Structural Reform in Railway 
Transport” (Russian Federation Government 2001).
The declared goals of the reform were to introduce com-
petition and facilitate private investment in the industry, 
improve the service quality, sustainability and safety, and 
reduce the economic costs of transportation. The program 
envisaged three phases.
The first phase (2001-2003) was aimed to separate the 
policy-making and regulatory functions from business 
management and operations. 
To achieve this, a 100% state-owned joint-stock company 
“Russian Railways” (Rossiiskye Zheleznye Dorogi - RZD) 
was established. The “policy-making” segment of MPS 
was integrated into the Ministry of Transport. RZD inhe-
rited all the basic assets of MPS, while numerous non-core 
structures such as hospitals, schools, etc. were divested. 
Significant staff reduction took place. At the same time, 
a considerable number of new legal acts were adopted in 
order to prepare the transition from state-owned railway 
monopoly to competitive railway industry. 
The second phase of the reform (2003-2005) was aimed at 
RZD corporate restructuring and further market-oriented 
legal base improvement.
During this period certain business lines and activities 
within the company were institutionally and legally sepa-
rated. More than 40 subsidiaries were established in the 
segments of container transportation, reefer services, new 
auto transportation, rolling stock repair, etc. Phasing out 
of internal cross-subsidizing of passenger operations of the 
expense of freight started. 
In the legal sphere the principle of non-discriminatory ac-
cess to railway infrastructure was declared, although RZD 
was still the only railway carrier. New legal acts and modi-
fied tariffs encouraged private investment in freight rail-
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cars. During this period the segment of so called “wagon 
operators” was rapidly growing up to eventually become 
one of the principal components of the Russian railway 
market model. 
The third phase of the reform (2006-2010) was planned 
to be a period of intensive attraction of private capital to 
the industry. Some of the RZD subsidiaries were to be pri-
vatized. It was planned to create a competitive market for 
freight transport services and, probably, long haul passen-
ger transportation. 
At the same time, within ten years of reform, after all the 
initial and preparatory steps described above, the model of 
the future railway market was not clear at all.
Reform model debates
The discussion on the railway reform model had actually 
begun much earlier than the 2001 Program was adopted. 
This discussion was far from being academic since it was a 
time of deep socio-economic transformations that drama-
tically changed the life of the whole country.
Some of the old-school experts came along with the slo-
gan “Hands off the railways!” They argued that the MPS 
system, so integral and solid, was capable of surviving 
through hard times – probably, with a little help from the 
government. But any serious intervention, they said, will 
lead to industry collapse and economic disaster.
But the majority agreed on the necessity and inevitability 
of the reform and discussed the appropriate model to be 
chosen. The main criteria were “Not to cause economic 
shocks”, “Not to make irreversible steps”, “Not to des-
troy the integrity of the system”. It sounded reasonable 
considering the dominating role of railways in freight 
transportation. 
As is known, international practice provides two main 
models of competitive railway market: a) competition 
between vertically-integrated companies (North America) 
or b) separating the infrastructure management from ope-
rations to establish a platform for competition of carriers 
“on rails” (introduced by the EU “railway” directives). 
In the course of discussion only a few voices called for 
straightforward choice of one of these models. Most of 
the experts and decision-makers agreed that some special 
approach was necessary - adequate to historic develop-
ment of railways and the current economic situation in 
Russia. In this case the “American” approach of creating 
several independent, integrated companies to compete 
with each other was unanimously rejected because it led 
to immediate “loss of system integrity” (although some 
dossier
international experts admitted the possibility of horizontal 
separation in the European part of Russia: see, for example 
(ECMT 2004)). The “European” model was seen as the 
possible option, but its implementation was meant to be 
very careful and gradual.
Finally, the following formulation concerning the reform 
model was included in the text of the Program: “…in the 
course of the structural reform conditions can be created 
to make possible the complete organizational separation 
of infrastructure and operations. The appropriate decision 
can be taken in the light of international experience”. At 
the same time, it was stipulated that necessary is “…to 
preserve the integration of infrastructure with a portion 
of freight operations, at least during the first years of the 
reform” (Russian Federation Government 2001).
As for the new competing carriers, the Program said the 
following: “on the basis of industrial railway transport 
(on-site railway operators - AK) and certain new-built 
local railway lines vertically integrated railway companies 
can be created. On the licensing basis these companies 
can be given the right to access the public infrastructure 
to carry out cargo transportation” (Russian Federation 
Government 2001).
Anyway, the Program was adopted, while there was no 
clear vision of the market model to be reached at the end. 
But the practical development of the reform had identi-
fied the basic principle of the new railway industry: wagon 
operators as the main competing market players.
Wagon operators 
The first wagon operators arrived on the stage in early 
2000s against a background of an acute shortage of rail-
cars. In 1998 the railways had purchased 6680 freight 
wagons while in 2001 only 104 (Farid Husainov 2012). 
The MPS, admitting the incapability of investment in the 
rolling stock, suggested that big shippers should buy rail-
cars for their cargoes in exchange for a tariff discount. 
This mechanism was implemented and a growing amount 
of freight was transported in shippers-owned rolling stock. 
Soon enough the number of private wagons had exceeded 
the demand in many industries and the fleet owners star-
ted outsourcing their railcar companies. 
The wagon operating business turned out to be very pro-
fitable due to free tariffs. Besides, wagon operators had no 
service obligations (unlike public railway that had to serve 
each registered customer) and they could choose the most 
attractive commodities and trade lanes. As a result, enor-
mous investments in the wagon operating segment were 
made not only by shippers but also by independent finan-
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cial structures as well. 
The government was satisfied by the fact that private busi-
ness was rapidly entering the railway transport. Some ob-
servers equated the growing competition between wagon 
operators to the intramodal competition declared among 
the reform priorities. 
RZD decided to participate in this process. In 2007 the 
First Cargo Company was established – the RZD-daughter 
wagon operator with 200 thousand ex-RZD wagons. In 
2010 it was followed by the Second Cargo Company 
(currently - Federal Cargo Company) with 175 thousand 
freight cars. RZD preserved a small fleet for its internal 
operating and maintenance needs only.
After all was finished, the freight railway market had ac-
quired the following structure unparalleled worldwide:
- RZD as a single state-owned monopolistic railway 
carrier, the owner of infrastructure and the long haul 
locomotives. No wagons in operation. RZD manages 
and executes transportation, issues waybills and fol-
lows a state-regulated tariff. The tariff has commodity 
classes, is weight and distance based and includes the 
“infrastructure”, the “locomotive” and the “wagon” 
components;
- More than 1400 wagon operators with the fleet of 
1,6 million railcars offer capacity to customers toge-
ther with a set of additional services (forwarding, do-
cumentation, mediation in relations with RZD, etc.). 
The wagon operator substracts the wagon component 
and charges the shipper adding the payment for his 
additional services. 
Passenger transportation
Reforms had affected the passenger transportation as well, 
and their results vary greatly in different segments of this 
business. 
The reform in the long-distance passenger segment was, 
probably, the most consistent one. The Federal Passenger 
Company (FPC) was established in 2009 as a subsidiary 
of the RZD. FPC owns the passenger wagon fleet (trac-
tion and infrastructure services are bought from RZD) 
and is legally acting as a carrier. At the same time, several 
independent private carriers occupy a small share of the 
market (about 5%), competing with FPC on the most po-
pular routes (Moscow - St. Petersburg, Moscow - Nizhny 
Novgorod, Moscow - Ekaterinburg, etc.).
The economy-class services of FPC are directly govern-
ment subsidized since the tariffs are regulated. This scheme 
dossier
had replaced the internal freight-to-passenger cross-subsi-
dies within RZD. At the same time, the tariffs for high-
class passenger services are deregulated.
The largest share in the structure of the rail passenger traf-
fic (about 90% of passenger-kilometers) belongs to subur-
ban (commuter) segment. It was planned to outsource this 
activity from RZD and to establish Regional Suburban 
Companies (RSC) holding the depots, rolling stock, etc. 
RSCs were to be owned - partly or entirely - by regional 
authorities. The latter were recommended by the govern-
ment either to subsidize their RSCs or to set their rates at 
the “economic level” (Julia Panova, et al. 2014).
But in practice most of the regions could not follow these 
recommendations. Subsidies would have been an unbea-
rable burden for their budgets while economic levelled 
suburban tariffs covering the costs would have meant the 
social shock for millions of passengers. 
In most of the regions RSCs act as the formally established 
administrative structures that are just selling tickets. The 
assets belong to RZD which is the operator as well. But 
RZD can’t run this business in full scale since it is for-
mally overtaken by the regions, and the federal subsidies 
are terminated. Cancelling of suburban trains is common 
practice now; in certain regions this activity is completely 
frozen. 
In the end of 2012 the new concept of the local passenger 
railway services was drafted which was aimed to tackle the 
mentioned problems, first of all, by passing corresponding 
legislation, but it is not adopted yet. In fact, the reform 
in suburban segment has effectively failed because of poor 
economic substantiation and the absence of an adequate 
legal base.
Reform results and remaining challenges
When the ten-year period of the 2001 Program had 
elapsed, the government prolonged the reform. “The 
Target Model of the railway freight market until 2015” 
was the document defining the further actions for five 
years. It expired on December 2015 bringing no funda-
mental changes to the industry. In the absence of any other 
governmental orders the reform can be formally conside-
red complete.
So what are the main results achieved during these 15 years? 
No matter how disappointed can many observers feel with 
the speed and character of the reforms, it should be admit-
ted that Russian railways had changed dramatically. 
Among the positive results it should be mentioned, pri-
marily, that the private capital had entered the industry. 
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About 50 billion USD in comparable prices were attrac-
ted (EBRD 2014), which solved the rolling stock shortage 
problem and gave good incentives to wagon-building.
The first competitive segment in the industry – wagon 
operating – is successfully developing. Many private wa-
gon operators are ready and eager to develop as full-scale 
railway carriers. A reasonable degree of success has been 
achieved in the long-haul passenger segment where the 
carrier company is outsourced and independent operators 
exist.
The policy and regulatory framework was separated from 
railway operations. A number of legal acts had been de-
veloped in order to adapt the industry to market condi-
tions. Particular new institutions (like independent freight 
carriers) are now envisaged legally, although do not exist 
in practice. The first timid steps were taken to deregulate 
both freight and passenger tariffs.The last but not the least 
to be mentioned here is that serious shocks were avoided. 
Railways were functioning sustainably enough. 
But the list of unsolved problems is even longer. There is 
still no competition in the freight transportation sector. 
RZD, being the monopolist here, has no incentives to 
improve services and decrease costs. 
Freight tariffs – even in their regulated part - are growing 
faster than the main shippers’ prices (indexes 2014 to 
2002 are 349% and 320% correspondingly) and faster 
than the trucking freight rates (indexes 2014 to 2002 are 
349% and 270% correspondingly. All the evaluations are 
related to 2014 to eliminate the influence of the economic 
crisis of 2015. Data: Rosstat 2016). It means that one of 
the main declared goals - to reduce the economic costs of 
transportation - is not reached.
The service quality is not improving. Cargo delivery speed 
is low (2002 – 290 km/day, 2013 – 223 km/day. Data: 
RZD 2016). Freight railway services are not available for 
many potential “unprofitable” shippers who are simply 
ignored by wagon operators. 
As a result, railways are losing freight in favor of road 
transport. The freight turnover index 2014 to 2007 is 10% 
for railways and 19% for trucking (Rosstat 2016). The re-
form in the socially sensitive suburban segment should be 
recognized as a complete failure. Obviously, there are still 
many challenges to be tackled. It appears that three main 
lessons should be learned to move forward.
1. The scale and economic importance of Russian 
railway system probably justify the careful and slow 
conversion. But, if so, the more important is the defi-
nite action plan. Unfortunately, the reform program 
dossier
had set out clear enough goals but did not contain a 
clear enough roadmap. Many steps in the course of the 
reform were done as a response to current market situa-
tion rather than according to the long-term strategy. 
2. The best results were achieved in wagon operation 
- the segment that was fully open to market forces. It 
does not mean that total privatizing is the best decision 
but indicates the main vector of the reform strategy: 
steadily opening the industry to competition.
3. Some experts argue that the current crisis situation is 
not the best time for changes. The Institute of Natural 
Monopolies Research (IPEM) - the Russian research 
center that develops recommendations often reflecting 
the opinion of the “reform headquarters” – confirms 
that the renewed reform strategy is necessary. But “…
at the same time, in the current crisis conditions, it 
is appropriate that this document should be aimed at 
«restoring order» and current problems solution, rather 
than at fundamental transformation” (IPEM 2016).
This mistake should not be committed. The reforms 
should not be frozen under any circumstances.
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1. Introduction
The large sunk costs that characterize investment in 
railways confer a considerable degree of natural mono-
poly to railway operators; in many situations attempting 
to replicate existing infrastructure to compete with an 
incumbent railway would be a ruinous endeavor. As a 
result there is a strong risk that rents can be extracted 
by private share-holders, through tariffs well above effi-
cient levels, or through over-manning and excessive cost 
and/or poor levels of service. Regulating the industry to 
contain these risks is a demanding task whether the sys-
tem is State-owned or private. Creating conditions for 
competition between train operators has proved in many 
circumstances to be more effective than direct regulation 
of tariffs; usually a combination of the two approaches is 
employed. Shippers will naturally lobby for measures that 
could reduce tariffs in their part of the market but the 
joint production of services that characterises rail opera-
tions makes judgement on what constitutes an efficient 
tariff complicated. 
In Mexico, uncertainty over the performance of the rai-
lways in terms of economic welfare led to proposals in 
2013 to radically change the legal framework for com-
petition, with the potential to substantially undermine 
the value of the existing freight concessions. In 1995, 
Mexico’s failing State-owned, monolithic railway compa-
ny was restructured and conceded to private freight train 
operators. The state retains ownership of the network but 
track is maintained and upgraded by vertically integrated 
rail companies under long term concessions. The conces-
sions were structured to provide for competition through 
parallel routes and source competition to key markets, 
through shared control of infrastructure around Mexico 
City and through provisions for access to the tracks of 
competitors on specifically identified parts of the network. 
Trackage rights have not developed to the extent initially 
envisaged, fueling claims by some shippers that tariffs in 
their markets are abusive and leading to the 2013 propo-
sals to impose generalized third party access rights across 
the network.  
This paper reviews the case for further reform in relation to 
competition on the basis of the performance and efficien-
cy of the freight railways since restructuring and assesses 
options for enhancing competition. The paper is based 
on the results of work undertaken by the International 
Transport Forum at the OECD for Mexico’s Ministry of 
Transport and Communications. The work was underta-
ken in two phases1 by teams of experts comprising Aimee 
Aguilar (ITF), Paul Amos (consultant), Victor Aragonés 
(US FRA), Ghislain Blanchard, (Canadian Transportation 
Agency), William Brennan (US STB), Benoit Denis 
(consultant), Jorge Kohon (consultant), Russel Pittmann 
(US DoJ), Louis Thompson (consultant) and the author. 
The analysis summarized in this paper was developed by 
this team.
2. Reform of the Railways in 1995
The railways were nationalized in Mexico in 1937 under 
a post revolution policy of collectivism and to allow the 
State to take over responsibility for investing in a more 
complete national network, something that could not be 
financed by the indebted “National Railway”, owned by 
Regulation, competition and performance of Mexico’s 
freight railways
Stephen Perkins*
* Head of Research and Policy Analysis, International Transport Forum, OECD,  stephen.perkins@itf-oecd.org
1 ITF (2014); ITF (2015).
2 Ley Reglementaria del Servicio Ferroviario, May 1995, http://www.sct.gob.mx/informacion-general/normatividad/transporte-ferroviario-y-multimodal/
leyes-federales/ .
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today and examines options for enhancing competition.
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foreign private investors. Service quality and performance 
remained weak, however, as a result of poor management 
and regulation under State ownership and operation. 
By the early 1990s the national railway, Ferrocarriles 
Nacionales de México (FNM or Ferronales), was running 
an annual deficit of more than half a billion US dollars and 
unreliable freight services were an impediment to econo-
mic development.
The remedy adopted was to break up FNM and offer 
concessions to run the railways. Restructuring began in 
1995 with the Law on the regulation of rail services2. 
Transfer to private operators began in 1997 and was com-
pleted in 1999. Three main concessions were awarded:
• TFM, now Kansas City Southern de Mexico (KCSM);
• Ferromex;
• Ferrosur;
• Plus a number of smaller concessions (including 
FCCM, Coahuila-Durango and Tijuana-Tecate). 
Access to Mexico City is provided by a neutral track access 
and terminal company (TFVM), jointly owned by KCSM, 
Ferromex, Ferrosur and the government. This accommo-
dates a commuter passenger operator as well as the freight 
services of the concession holders.
The government sought to generate revenue from selling 
the concessions and received approximately USD 3 billion 
(2014 prices). The concessions offered were therefore long 
term (50 years) with exclusive rights to serve their terri-
tories (for an initial period of 30 years), with only some 
well-defined and limited exceptions where concessions 
were required to negotiate conditions for access by another 
concession. The most important of these “trackage rights” 
were for KCSM to use Ferromex tracks from Queretaro to 
Guadalajara (Mexico’s second city) and Ferromex access 
to KCSM’s Viborillas to Ramos Arizpe segment on the 
main line north to the industrial and commercial centres 
of Saltillo and Monterrey. Negotiations over implementa-
tion of these rights were protracted and were not settled 
until 2011.
In 2002, Grupo Mexico, owner of Ferromex, agreed to 
acquire Ferrosur but the take-over was rejected by the 
Federal Competition Commission (then CFC, now 
COFECE). In 2005, Grupo Mexico purchased Ferrosur 
for USD 300 million, but the acquisition was opposed by 
KCSM and COFECE rejected the purchase in 2006. The 
decision was appealed and the acquisition was permitted 
to go ahead by a Tribunal in 2011, with Ferromex and 
KCSM agreeing to terms for the exercise of access rights 
on critical sections of track to pave the way for approval. 
During the same period, KCSM was permitted to buy 
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out the other investors in TFM and is now the primary 
owner. As a result, Mexico now effectively has two large 
rail concessions – KCSM and Ferromex/Ferrosur – along 
with the remaining small concessions.
A number of potential system structures were investigated 
in preparing for the 1995 reforms, ranging from retention 
of a single company to be operated by the private sector, 
that would have been in control of all infrastructure and 
train operations, to fully open access competition in which 
infrastructure would have been concessioned separately 
from train operators and all concessioned train operators 
would have been able to operate and compete throughout 
the network. The solution adopted was a hybrid approach 
adapted to Mexican geography and freight markets (Figure 
1).
Figure 1  The concessioning structure
Source:  SCT.
The structure adopted yields four types of rail-versus-rail 
competition (it should also be noted that there is strong 
competition from road haulage in many rail markets):
• Direct competition, with alternative routes to key lo-
cations (e.g. Monterrey) by two principal competing 
concessions.
• Side-by-side (parallel) competition, for example by 
Ferromex and KCSM from the U.S. border to Mexico 
City, or by Ferromex from the port of Manzanillo 
versus KCSM from the port of Lazaro Cardenas to 
Queretaro (and to Mexico City); plus
• Alternative source competition, for example by KCSM 
from the port of Lazaro Cardenas versus Ferrosur 
(now part of Ferromex) from the port of Veracruz, 
both to Mexico City. 
• Mandated trackage rights, where one railway operates 
over the tracks of another and pays a fee for doing 
so in specific markets where traffic is high enough to 
support two operators. 
About 2 161 kms of trackage rights were identified in 1995. 
The route length subject to trackage rights amounted to 
12% of the total of 17 776 kms concessioned (Figure 2).
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3. Performance of the Freight Railways
Since transfer to private concessions in 1998, rail tonne-
kilometres have grown over 50 percent, faster than natio-
nal GDP (45 percent) or US Class I freight railways (26 
percent) (Figure 3). Traffic density has grown in line with 
traffic and labour productivity is over six times higher. 
Average rail freight costs have fallen by about 20 percent 
since concessioning (Figure 4). 
 Along with the US and Canada, Mexican average rail 
freight tariffs are the lowest in the world. Mexican and 
dossier
US tariffs would be essentially equal, if the US average 
tariffs were to be adjusted to account for the extremely 
low rates charged for coal (the Mexican railways transport 
little coal). Figure 4 shows the freight tariffs applied by 
FNM together with the tariffs that would have had to be 
charged to break even, reflecting the share of annual losses 
attributable to freight, as opposed to passenger operations.
Table 1 indicates the performance of Mexican railways in 
1996, under FNM management, and in 2006 and 2012 
under concessioned management against the producti-
vity indicators. The efficiency improvements are large. 
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Source: SCT.
Figure 2.  Mandatory trackage rights specified in 1995 rai-
Figure 3.  Mexico: Rail tonne-km vs GDP (index 1998=100)
Source: STB, Statistics of Class I Railroads, various years; and SCT, Anuario Estadistico 2013.
Figure 4.  Average rail freight tariffs  (2012 US cents/tonne-km)
Source: ITF 2014, Freight Railway Development in Mexico, updated.
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Increases in the productivity of locomotives and freight 
cars exceed 50%. Labour productivity has improved by 6 
times as a result of the changes in operational practices, 
better management and investment.
Table 1.  Performance evolution of the Mexican railway 
system 1996-2012
Indicator 1996 2006 2012
Ton-kms per locomotive 
(million)
26.9 59.8 59.9
Ton-kms per freight car 
(million)
1.56 2.30 2.71
Ton-kms per employee 
(million)
0.81 5.43 5.33
Ton-kms per litre of fuel 80 107 116
Source: IMT, 2014.
Ferromex and KCSM, the largest Mexican railways, have 
the highest locomotive productivity among 23 non-mi-
ning railways of Latin America, leading by a clear margin. 
Figure 5 compares the average railway freight tariff of 18 
railways in Latin America for which public information 
is available. Ferromex charges an average 3 U.S. cents per 
ton-km, the lowest tariff in the group (KCSM charges 
an average of about 3.8 cents per ton-km). All railways 
included in Figure 3.8 move general cargo traffic with the 
exception of MRS in Brazil, the only big mining railway 
(130 million tons in 2011) in the sample. Even so, MRS 
has higher average tariffs than Ferromex.
Figure 5.  Average tariff of different railways in Latin America 
2011-12 (US cents per ton-km)
Source: IDB, 2013.
Earnings data filed by Ferromex and KCSM with the US 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) indicate that the 
performance of the Mexican concessions falls within the 
dossier
range of US and Canadian Class I freight railroads (Table 
2). Without question, the Mexican concessions have be-
come world class performers.
Earnings data filed by Ferromex and KCSM with the US 
Association of American Railroads (AAR) indicate that the 
performance of the Mexican concessions falls within the 
range of US and Canadian Class I freight railroads (Table 
2). Without question, the Mexican concessions have be-
come world class performers.
Table 2.  Operating ratios of AAR members












Note: Operating ratio is the ratio of operating expenses to operating reve-
nues.
Source: AAR, "Railroad Facts, 2014 edition, pages 69-81.
4. Trackage Rights and Protection of Captive Shippers
Rail provides a range of bulk, container and specialized 
services in Mexico and faces strong competition from 
road haulage in most markets. It has a natural advantage 
carrying heavy loads on routes with high density traffic 
and bulk shippers such as grain, cement and steel are 
particularly sensitive to rail tariffs as competition from 
trucking is much weaker for these commodities. Mexican 
railway operations are fully integrated with the railways 
of the USA and Canada, with numerous cross-border ser-
vices. Some of the most profitable services serve industrial 
plants, notably car manufacturing, located either side of 
the US border. Inward investment by US and Japanese car 
manufacturers in Mexico has relied on high quality rail 
services that enable the virtual integration of plants, with 
parts and semi-finished goods crossing the border several 
times before the final product is shipped. For international 
transport, rail carries the advantage over trucking of avoi-
ding delays for inspections at the border through the use 
of bonded containers. 
The geographical design of the rail concessions and the 
specification of trackage rights was structured to provide 
for rail on rail competition in the major markets. The 
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long delays already noted in the concessions reaching 
agreements on the terms for use of trackage rights reflect 
an underlying mutual preference for avoiding competi-
tion. The 1995 railway law provides for the Ministry of 
Transport and Communications to impose conditions 
where concessionaires fail to reach mutual terms in order 
that shippers can negotiate with competing train opera-
tors. The Ministry intervened to do this on a number of 
occasions but the concessions used the courts to prevent 
implementation of the imposed rates. The determinations 
were blocked by ‘Amparo’ – the Spanish legal term - on the 
grounds that they confiscated value from the rights conce-
ded to the railways. Amparo is a legal safeguard introduced 
to protect businesses and individuals from arbitrary confis-
cation of property by the State. Judges base decisions on 
whether the State marshals sufficient evidence to show that 
its decision respects the law. In the case of economic regu-
lation this means the intention of the law in the guiding 
the operation of the market and driving positive welfare 
outcomes. It seems most likely that the determinations 
of the Ministry on conditions for the exercise of trackage 
rights failed this test in the eyes of the judges because they 
were not equipped with the economic expertise and legal 
capacity to demonstrate conformity with the competition 
objectives of the law. More convincing argument and do-
cumentation might have led to a different result.
Captive shippers enjoy protections under Mexican 
law, with the Ministry to set tariffs in cases where the 
Competition Agency (COFECE) determines ‘effective 
competition’ is absent. The tests of effective competition 
include intermodal competition and given the extensive 
highway network in Mexico therefore set a relatively high 
hurdle. Neither the Ministry nor the Competition Agency 
have dedicated expertise in this field. No cases of regulated 
tariffs have been imposed because of an absence of effec-
tive competition to date.  
These shortcomings in the capacity to make regulatory 
determinations led in 2013 to a legislative proposal in 
Congress, with cross-party support, to introduce open 
access provisions across the network (Gaceta 2013). Had 
the proposed change to the railway law been implemented 
as formulated, it would in all probability have severely cur-
tailed investment in the rail network by the concessions. 
With the uncertainty created over revenues, and also in the 
management of train operations - with shippers as well as 
other concessions holding rights to run trains over conces-
sioned tracks - shareholders would be extremely reluctant 
to put money at risk. Open access arrangements might be 
possible in Mexico but probably only if the government 
was prepared to take over a substantial share of the res-
ponsibility for funding infrastructure. 
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Following extensive stakeholder inquiry the Senate modi-
fied the proposed amendments to the Railway law, remo-
ving the open access provisions. It instead required the 
Ministry of Transport and Communications to establish 
a Regulatory Agency for Rail Transport (ARTF) to streng-
then capacity for intervention in setting conditions for the 
use of trackage rights and tariffs where competition is dee-
med ineffective. Unfortunately the amendment adopted 
included a provision that the Agency should be funded 
within the existing financial resources of the Ministry. 
Given the need recognized by the Senate to substantially 
enhance regulatory capacity, this restriction could severely 
compromise delivery. Should this prove the case the first 
response should be to add resources in terms of qualified 
experts in competition economics and law. The Agency 
was established in 2016.  
The basic economic characteristic of railways (relatively 
high fixed costs, and relatively low marginal costs) tend to 
force concentration of competition between a small num-
ber of operators rather than atomisation of competition. 
The need to recover fixed costs leads inevitably to some 
form of “Ramsey pricing” where shippers pay rates that 
reflect in part their elasticity of demand.   This is a dis-
criminatory but efficient pricing system for arriving at a 
financial sustainable optimum. For any particular service, 
it is rational for the firm to lower its prices as far toward 
variable (or marginal) costs as competitive conditions re-
quire. Pricing all services close to variable costs would not 
permit recovery of fixed costs. Fixed costs are recovered 
by charging each service or customer a rate that is as far 
above variable cost as possible, which generally depends on 
the customer’s price elasticity of demand. Summed over 
the full set of customers, the contributions to fixed costs 
should be sufficient to recover total fixed costs. 
Discrimination between different users requesting essen-
tially the same services is proscribed by competition law 
everywhere, including in the Mexican Railway Law. This is 
essential for fair competition. This more general, arbitrary 
type of discrimination should not, however, be confused 
with Ramsey pricing, which is essential to maximising 
the benefit of the railway system to the overall economy. 
Trying to impose uniform tariffs or an arbitrary average 
contribution to fixed costs would seriously undermine effi-
ciency and price some users off the railway.
US regulation accepts Ramsey pricing and focuses on 
identifying and rectifying cases in which market power 
has been abused. US law and related regulations contain 
reasonably detailed definitions of what might constitute 
abuse: total revenues that are more than those required to 
recover costs including a reasonable return on investment; 
prices for a shipment that exceed stand-alone costs; a reve-
nue to marginal cost ratio greater than 180 %; inefficient 
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operating costs; or abrupt changes in tariffs that would 
cause disruption. The US definition of effective compe-
tition combined with exemptions from any regulation for 
contract rates and exempt services means that only about 
10 percent of traffic is eligible for regulation. It has led 
to a wide range of average tariffs by commodity and of 
ratios of revenue to variable cost. The ‘internationally 
recognised criteria and principles’ that the Mexican Rail 
Regulatory Agency is required to adopt will need to in-
clude Ramsey pricing, acknowledging that prices can vary 
greatly between different categories of shipper. There is no 
reason to expect the differences to be any less marked than 
they are in the US.
5. Conclusion
The 1995 restructuring of Mexico’s railways has been re-
markably successful; on a par with the results of the 1981 
Staggers Act reform in the USA. Financial performance 
of Mexico’s two main concessions rivals that of US and 
Canadian Class 1 railways and average tariffs are at simi-
lar, low levels. Mexico’s railways are the most productive 
in Latin America and investment since 1995 is gradually 
raising technical standards to those elsewhere in North 
America. The success of the railways has contributed signi-
ficantly to economic growth and supported inward invest-
ment in critical sectors of the economy; 50% of rail freight 
carried in Mexico crosses the US border. 
Structuring the concessions to provide for rail-on-rail 
competition in most key markets has been successful in 
improving the quality of services and reducing tariffs. 
Competition could and should be enhanced, howe-
ver, through fuller use of trackage rights. The reason 
these have not been exploited to the extent envisaged 
in the 1995 reform is a lack of regulatory capacity in 
Government. Interventions by the Ministry of Transport 
and Communications to set access conditions and prices 
where concessions failed to agree terms were blocked by 
concessions appealing to the courts where judges were 
not convinced of the legitimacy of intervention, most 
probably because of inadequate economic argumentation 
and evidence. The Ministry was similarly poorly equipped 
to intervene to set tariffs in markets where competition 
might be deemed to be ineffective.
The response to this deficit has to be reinforcement of re-
gulatory capacity and the Senate is to be congratulated for 
having decided in 2014 to enhance regulatory capacity by 
establishing a rail regulatory agency rather than imposing 
new open access rights on a system of what are designed to 
be exclusive concessions, as proposed initially by Congress. 
The high fixed and relatively low marginal costs of railway 
infrastructure make atomistic competition impossible and 
dossier
discriminatory pricing essential to cost recovery. 
The expertise required to regulate railways efficiently has 
resulted in many jurisdictions in the establishment of spe-
cific regulatory agencies, which share responsibilities for 
competition in the railways with competition authorities. 
Confusion over price discrimination between different 
market segments on the one hand and different shippers 
seeking essentially the same service on the other hand is 
frequent, both inside and outside of Mexico. This makes 
the regulation of competition in railways an often contro-
versial question. The world’s most successful general cargo 
railways all practice price discrimination in the form of 
Ramsey pricing and Mexico is no exception. The challenge 
for the new Regulatory Agency should not be underesti-
mated. The lessons illustrated by the legislative process in 
Mexico are valuable for railways everywhere.   
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Managemnet of Urban Infrastructures
A Massive Open Online Course by EPFL - MIR - IGLUS
In recent years, online courses have emerged as a game changer in the educational landscape. Massive Open 
Online Courses (MOOCs), covering a wide variety of subject matters, are now available to practitioners, as 
well as academics, and continue to attract increasingly large audiences via online education platforms such 
as Coursera and EdX. These online courses enable learners to choose from a diverse array of subjects and to 
freely explore those that are most interesting to them at their own pace. The combination of the flexibility 
associated with online education and the high quality of courses offered by world-class universities, have 
turned MOOCs into an appealing learning reference for many. As a result, these courses have become par-
ticularly invaluable to those practitioners who have limited time and tight schedules restricting them from 
attending conventional training programs, but still feel the need to stay up to date with the cutting edge 
knowledge in their fields. 
As of February 2016, the Chair Management of Network Industries (MIR), is offering a free online course on 
the Management of Urban Infrastructures as one of the products of a global action research initiative relating 
to the Innovative Governance of Large Urban Systems, called IGLUS. This free, and on-demand, course covers 
the basic principles of the management of urban Infrastructures and illustrates these principles through a 
deeper investigation of two of the most important urban infrastructures- the urban energy and transporta-
tion sectors. 
In this online course we, at EPFL, have worked with a series of our partners in the IGLUS project, namely the 
World Bank, The Veolia Environment group, Swiss Post, City-Canton of Geneva, Boston Consulting Group, and 
City University of New York. By providing a combination of inputs from both academia and industry experts, 
we have tried to give a balanced overview of the basic principles of urban infrastructure management and to 
also illustrate how practitioners make use of these principles in the real-world. 
In less than 10 months, about 9000 learners had enrolled in the course and the feedback from this large 
audience is quite promising (Click here to see the feedback). The online learning forum associated with this 
course provides us with a unique opportunity to host discussions and hear a range of diverse perspectives 
on the managerial issues raised in the course. People attending the course represent more than 90 different 
nationalities, and the debates centered around the course materials reflect this diversity and are in them-
selves an immense learning opportunity, both for us and our learners. You can find more information about 
free registration in this course by visiting the IGLUS webpage at: http://iglus.org/mooc
We are currently planning the second part of the course that is set to go online Spring 2017. The second 
part of the course will have a more keen focus on the Management of Urban Infrastructures in presence of 
disruptive innovations introduced by the ICT sector; which can be labeled as Management of Smart Urban 
Infrastructures. 
Online courses that cover managerial, regulatory and governance issues in different network industries are 
becoming increasingly more prevalent. So, as of this issue of NIQ we will introduce a new section that closely 
follows the world of online education and reviews the currently available, and the upcoming, MOOCs that 
might be useful for academics and practitioners active in the field of Network Industries. 
If you would like to write a review about a MOOC and publish it in an upcoming issue of NIQ, please send an 
email to mohamad.razaghi@epfl.ch.
Review of Online courses related to Network Industries
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 17, issue 1, 2017 (March) “The  framework for liberali-
sation and regulation of public utilities in countries of ex-Yugoslavia” 
The forthcoming edition of Network Industries’ Quarterly will be a special edition focused on countries of ex-
Yugoslavia, among which two are EU member states (Slovenia and Croatia), two are in the process of acces-
sion negotiations (Montenegro, Serbia), a candidate country (Macedonia) and a potential candidate country 
(Bosnia and Herzegovina).
After the II World War, ex-Yugoslavia was a unique example of self-management, a specific system of gover-
nance and societal ownership of companies, including public utilities. In early 1990s, Yugoslav disintegration 
and democratization coincided with economic transformation from socialist-market economy to a market 
economy. However, legacies of the past economic system are still present in some aspect, and influence the 
process of liberalisation of public utilities, which was in these countries urged by joining the EU or is still urged 
by EU accession requirements. Market liberalisation agenda begun to come to the front, and the regulatory 
reform urged creation of independent regulatory agencies for state-wide public utilities such as electricity 
and gas markets. On the other side, municipal (communal) services are mainly provided by local authorities 
and public operators. Liberalisation agenda in many of these countries presupposes privatization of public 
undertakings or alternatives to privatization such are PPPs and concessions, and special attention will be 
given to the general legal framework for PPPs and concessions in the above countries.
The following are some of the issues the country contributions would try to address:
• The scope and characteristics of public undertakings providing utilities and the character of corporate 
governance of public utilities;
• PPPs and concessions as an “alternative” to full privatization: basic overview of active projects and refe-
rence to the legal and institutional framework for PPPs and concessions;
• Liberalisation agenda and the main issues in regulating local public utilities, such as water provision and 
waste management;
• The character of regulatory powers and challenges posed to municipalities in regulating communal ser-
vices.
The Guest Editor of this Special Issue is Tatjana Jovanic, Associate Professor of Economic Law and Market 
Regulation at the University of Belgrade Faculty of Law.
If you are interested to contribute, please send an email to Ms Nadia Bert (FSR.Transport@eui.eu). 
The Network Industries Quarterly carries an ISBN number and is published by Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale 
Lausanne (EPFL) and the Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute). Published four times 
a year and distributes to approx. 6000 interested subscribers worldwide, the NIQ is included in Cadmus, the 
EUI’s Research Repository. You can find the latest issues of the NIQ here:
- Vol 18 - no 4 - 2016 – Reform of the Railway Sector and its Achievements: global overview 
- Vol 18 - no 3 - 2016 – The challenges of digitalization and the use of data  
- Vol 18 - no 2 - 2016 – Financing of infrastructures in Latin America 
- Vol 18 - no 1 - 2016 – Achievements and challenges regarding public utilities’ regulation in Brazil
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Network Industries Quarterly, Vol. 17, issue 2, 2017 (June) “Competition Policy in Energy 
Markets: The Experience of Emerging Economies” 
The regulatory reform in developing countries took a prominent role in the 1990s. Both external and inter-
nal factors pushed many countries to liberalize their energy markets and introduce independent regulatory 
agencies to oversee the regulatory reforms. In the beginning, competition policy remained in the background. 
However, as liberalizations and regulatory reforms matured, competition policy has begun to come to the 
front. The advances such as technology and result-based tariff models also brought issues of anti-competitive 
behaviour in energy markets. 
While technological and economic advances shape the new market framework, the economic literature 
catches up with the evolution of energy markets. For example, the competition issues created by incentive 
regulation models still do not get the attention they deserve.
This call for papers aims at contributing to the literature to close the gap, searching for academic contribu-
tions able to explore the major issues surrounding concurrent application of competition and regulation. The 
following are some of the issues we hope to address:
• The tensions between competition policy and regulation in energy markets,
• The evolution of tariff models and their relation to competition,
• Major competition investigations in the industry in the EU and US,
• Differing approaches to competition policy in both civil law and common law traditions, 
• How advances in technologies affect the role of competition policy,
• The potential for deregulation in the energy markets.
We welcome proposals in the form of a short abstract of max 200 words that touch these and other issues 
related to competition policy in energy markets, either with a case study or a comparative approach and 
grounded on empirical research. The deadline for abstracts is January 30th, 2017. The final paper should 
not exceed 1.700 words length (all included). A preliminary draft is expected by May 28th, 2017. If you are 
interested to contribute, please send an email to the guest editor of this special issue on “Competition Policy 
in Energy Markets: The Experience of Emerging Economies”, Mr Fuat Oguz (foguz@ybu.edu.tr) with a cc to 
Ms Nadia Bert (FSR.Transport@eui.eu). 
The Network Industries Quarterly carries an ISBN number and is published by Ecole Polytechnique Fédérale 
Lausanne (EPFL) and the Florence School of Regulation (European University Institute). Published four times 
a year and distributes to approx. 6000 interested subscribers worldwide, the NIQ is included in Cadmus, the 
EUI’s Research Repository. You can find the latest issues of the NIQ here:
- Vol 18 - no 4 - 2016 – Reform of the Railway Sector and its Achievements: global overview 
- Vol 18 - no 3 - 2016 – The challenges of digitalization and the use of data  
- Vol 18 - no 2 - 2016 – Financing of infrastructures in Latin America 
- Vol 18 - no 1 - 2016 – Achievements and challenges regarding public utilities’ regulation in Brazil
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Workshop by the University of Antwerp: “Ship finance in the Basel IV era”
28th February 2017 @ 2:00 pm - 4:30 pm
Auditorium BNP Paribas Fortis (Rue Royal/Koningsstraat 20, Brussels) 
The shipping industry struggles with overcapacity, low freight rates, the implementation of new (environ-
mental) regulations and a shortage of bank financing. This sector is very capital intensive. Hence, securing 
the funding of ships is very important. The latter is topical given the recent developments with respect to 
Basel IV. Basel IV involves more stringent capital requirements and greater financial disclosure. 
Which impact can be expected for the shipping industry? To answer this question, the BNP Paribas Fortis 
Chair Transport, Logistics and Ports organizes within the EU shipping week a seminar “Ship financing in the 
Basel IV era”.
After two keynote speeches by BNP Paribas, a leading ship financing bank, a panel discussion with people 
from the shipping industry, academic world and DG FISMA (speakers to be confirmed) will be scheduled. A 
network drink will close this event.
For further information please contact Elisabet Naert (elisabet.naert@bnpparibasfortis.com or +32 (0)2 565 
63 65). 
European Shipping Week: 27 February to 3 March 2017, Brussels
The first European Shipping Week took place over the course of the week of 2-6 of March 2015 and featured 
a variety of events. The second will take place in Brussels from Monday, 27 February to Friday, 3 March 2017 
and promises to be an even greater success.
European Shipping Week is intended to be a platform where policy-makers from the main EU institutions 
will meet and engage with European shipowners and other stakeholders from the shipping sector. The focus 
is on shipping, in all its different aspects.
European Shipping Week is the brainchild of the European Community Shipowners' Associations (ECSA) and 
is run by a Steering Group made up of Europe's main shipping organisations as well as the European Com-
mission and Shipping Innovation. The shipping organisations involved on the Steering Group include: ECSA; 
Cruise Lines International Association (CLIA) Europe; European Community Association of Ship Brokers and 
Agents (ECASBA); Interferry; the European Dredging Association (EuDA); the World Shipping Council (WSC); 
the European Transport Workers’ Federation (ETF); the European Tugowners’ Association (ETA); as well as 
the European Maritime Pilots Association (EMPA).
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